History and boundaries are the foundations of international economic law (IEL) as a professional and intellectual field. History is often told to support a wide variety of present projects, norms and ideas by appealing to the past. Boundary is a technique frequently used to map and defend an exclusive domain for applying the IEL expertise to a broad range of programmes, rules and theories. This article first describes how history and boundaries interact to produce a 'traditional' view of IEL past and present place in the world economy. This interaction structures how lawyers assert the authority and legitimacy of IEL in global economic governance. It then argues that the commitments of the traditional approach to Anglocentrism and Modernism limit lawyers' ability to understand and solve the present-day issues, since it produces lessons only in support of the dominant programmes, norms and ideas under contestation. Consequently, it constrains, instead of empowers, lawyers' imagination. Building on this critique, the article outlines an alternative approach devised to rethink the IEL field and, more importantly, which past or new projects, norms and theories do or do not count (or should or should not count) as part of it. It concludes with reflections on how we might go about reimagining IEL in response to the contemporary challenges to global economic governance.
Introduction
The field of international economic law (IEL) holds in high esteem its own history and boundaries.
From its founding fathers until today's highly specialized lawyers, debates about the origins and evolution, autonomy and frontiers of IEL have been an essential part of the discipline. Yet, bothhistory and boundaries -seem to be experienced as unrelated, or perhaps contrasting, modes of disciplinary governance situated on opposite sides of the IEL expertise.
On the one hand, history tends to trigger lawyers' imagination of IEL as a disciplinary technique that governs the movement of meanings across time. Historical narratives are regarded as a way of providing support to a wide variety of IEL projects, norms, institutions and ideas by connecting their past to the present. On the other hand, boundaries tend to cause lawyers to think of IEL as a disciplinary technique that controls the movement of meanings across space. Demarcation is considered a way to vindicate the existence of a(n) (exclusive) domain for the application of IEL expertise to a broad range of programmes, rules, regimes, ideas and methods, by distinguishing it from the others.
The purpose of this article is to describe, criticise and offer an alternative to the disciplinary consensus around the interaction between the history and boundaries of international economic law.
By examining this interplay, I intend to rethink the ways in which international lawyers have approached to and dealt with foundational and contemporary questions about global economic law and governance. More specifically, I question as to what a study of the history and boundaries can tell us today about the current limitations of its expertise and the possibilities it provides to reform or transform itself and the contemporary international economic order. Hence, my ultimate goal is to invite the IEL field to reflect upon the self-imposed disciplinary limitations and their political and intellectual consequences.
The argument unfolds in three parts. Section I presents and analyses the traditional approach to the history of international economic law. Section II discusses the limits of the traditional approach.
Building on this critique, section III proposes to rethink how history and boundaries relate to one another by offering an alternative approach. In the conclusion, the article returns to the central issues involving the interplay between history and boundaries inside and outside of the field of international economic law. From an external viewpoint, it argues that the disciplinary boundaries have done a great deal of work in preventing international lawyers from offering satisfactory solutions to the contemporary challenges facing global economic governance. From an internal perspective, it asserts that the field's boundaries result from the interaction between intellectual debates meaningfully grounded in history lessons and the political disputes arising out of collective and individual pursuits of authority and legitimacy. Therefore, to break up the imaginative gridlock on the IEL expertise, the solution advocated by the article is to move away from the traditional approach and towards to the alternative approach.
I. From the Present to the Past, the Traditional Approach to the History of International Economic Law
The purpose of this section is to depict the traditional approach to the history of international economic law from the scholarly literature. The analysis suggests that the traditional approach is widely employed to construct history lessons, which, in turn, play a fundamental role in influencing the ways lawyers understand and offer solutions to the contemporary challenges of global economic governance.
A. Robert Howse and the Present Boundaries of International Economic Law
In a recent publication, the Canadian professor Robert Howse 1 invites us -international lawyers -to rethink the boundaries of the field of international economic law. 2 He calls our attention to the fact that only a few of us possess appropriate knowledge of economics to reflect upon and deal with the contemporary problems of global economic governance. 3 He has in mind our limitations to cope with the political, social and economic consequences arising out of the unequal distribution of the gains and losses of the last three decades of globalization. It seems that his concern lies, particularly, in the apparent mismatch between the powerful position held by international lawyers in the world economy and our lack of satisfactory understanding of economics, or perhaps uncritical acceptance of dominant economic doctrines as valid and legitimate. To understand the ways in which international lawyers have been implicated in managing the present-day international economic order as well as in shaping the conditions of possibility for transforming it, he offers a brief account of his own experience as a junior scholar in North America to illustrate how law students have been trained in the IEL expertise since the late-1980s.
In his recollection, Howse describes the steps undertaken by him to accede to the IEL field. INTERNATIONAL LAW 187-196 (2017) . 4 Howse, above n 3, at 188-189. jurisprudential tradition across Western countries, the disciplinary line was drawn by attributing an ontological definition to IEL, which would carry with it implicit normative consequences.
International economic law, recalls Howse, has been taught as "an instrument that serves rational international economic policy; rational policy is about efficiency; efficiency leads to growth; efficiency requires open markets, with strong protections for property and contractual rights and disciplines on government intervention. Questions of justice or redistribution should remain 'elsewhere': they do not belong to international economic law."
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To my mind, Howse's recollection calls attention, consciously or otherwise, to the effects of a fundamental, but often neglected, mode of expert governance 6 employed by the IEL field, disciplinary boundary. 7 The notion of boundaries tends to cause lawyers to think of IEL as a technique 8 for controlling the movement of meanings across space through demarcation. It is implicated, directly, in controlling what and who count or not as part of IEL, and, indirectly, in determining which rules, actors and knowledge are authoritative and legitimate. Within the IEL field, demarcation is a process involving decision-making and consensus-building. The consensus around the authority and legitimacy of norms, actors and ideas is built up by a discipline's ritualized process of framing and answering questions. 9 The responses are choices about intellectual, normative and political matters. 5 Howse, above n 3, at 188. 6 Inspired by science and technology studies (STS) literature, modes of expert governance are conceived as disciplinary mechanisms for the production, management and application of knowledge, norms and identities. They are created and used to coordinate expert systems and purposive action. In this sense, they are relatively institutionalized structures of governing decision-making constituted by a characteristic range of substantive and procedural assumptions as well as styles of thinking and reasoning. Consequently, they are employed to make, sustain and transform knowledge, norms and identities with the purpose of applying them to frame the issues under consideration and craft arguments in order to influence concrete situations or to prevent and resolve disputes. The political and intellectual process through which knowledge, norms and identities are constituted and adapted is defined as governance. WORLD TRADE 194-197 (2001) .
existence of a special body of positive norms and regimes, which required a specialized set of knowledge and skills distinct from other (public/private and international/domestic) law provinces. (2007), above n 27, at 3-4; Jackson, above n 29, at 31-34; Lowenfeld, above n 22, at 21-26; Winham, above n 27, at 14; Trebilcock et al, above n 27, at 24-25; Herdegen, above n 27, at 195-197. 33 More precisely, the Bretton Woods Agreement envisaged the creation of three new international economic organizations: IMF, World Bank and ITO. The IMF, responsible for governing global monetary policy through the maintenance of exchange rate stability, and the provision of assistance to countries facing balance of payment crises. The World Bank was in charge of international financial policies, which consisted initially of providing reconstruction to countries whose economies had been devastated by the Second Wold War. After having successfully contributed to the Marshall Plan, the mandate of the World Bank was expanded to focus on providing development capital to developing countries. The ITO was conceived to govern the negotiation and administration of a new international trading regime (Trebilcock et al, above n 27, at 24-25). 34 Interestingly, the conventional literature often goes beyond the negotiations leading up to the draft ITO Charter. Notwithstanding, Charnovitz's institutional storyline stops at this historical landmark, leaving the impression that the events prior to the GATT rest on the past while placing the post-1947 institutions in the present. This understanding would make sense if Charnovitz's jurisprudential narrative followed the same timeline; however, as I shall discuss below, he does not. Instead, he tells the evolution of IEL jurisprudence from the interwar until the early 1990s, and then to the present. 
The Jurisprudential History of International Economic Law
Juxtaposed with this institutional storyline, Charnovitz provides a historical account that identifies the IEL field with the progression of canonical writings. 38 In section III, he retells the conventional narrative of the evolution of legal ideas and practices that led up to the formation of a vernacular of concepts and techniques employed by the 'champions' of IEL to make sense of international economic relations.
39 36 Jackson, above n 27, at 4; Jackson, above n 29, at 34-37, 42-43; Lowenfeld, above n 22, at 46-67; Winham, above n 27, at 14-21; Trebilcock et al, above n 27, at 24-26; Herdegen, above n 27, at 15-16, 195-199. 37 Other important achievements were the following: the replacement of 'GATT à la carte' approach for the 'single understanding' ensured that all members would be subject to the entire body of WTO agreements; and the creation of the Dispute Settlement Body represented the passage from a power-oriented to a rule-oriented system. 38 Charnovitz, above n 22, at 616-624. 39 The jurisprudential development is closely knitted to the continuous institutionalization of international economic governance. In contrast to Section II, section III focuses almost exclusively on the IEL jurisprudence developed from the 1940s until the 2010s, leaving aside canonical texts that were older or solely dedicated to international trade law. This far-reaching storyline differs not only from the institutional story but also from the conventional literature. Since Charnovitz does not explain these differences, I will follow the mainstream accounts, which means to limit the canonical narrative to 1994, and complement it with international trade law. rather than academically-oriented, international lawyers. They sought to rethink legal expertise as a way of reclaiming their participation in international economic policy-and law-making. 57 The conventional account chronicles how they gradually shifted the mind-set towards functionalist, realist and pragmatic attitudes and mentality. 58 They were less interested in ontological and epistemological disputes over the existence of IEL, and more preoccupied with its functions, effectiveness, and the application of its expertise to solve problems of the world economy. By strategically linking 54 For the jurisprudential story of international economic law, vide generally above n 38-50, and accompanying text. 55 Chronicled as a 'eureka' moment, they later found out that this unique domain was, in fact, an autonomous field, and so named it as international economic law. Despite the efforts of those frontrunners, the emergence of the IEL expertise is conventionally regarded as having had little or no influence over international economic law or governance. Three factors are considered to have collaborated for its disempowerment. The political and economic challenges pervading the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s would have accrued a chilling effect on international lawyers' aspirations. Moreover, the postwar international economic order would have been operated and managed mostly by non-legal experts, to the extent that international economic affairs were considered as of 'low' political priority and dominated by more 'technical', and less or none 'juridical', matters. Finally, the 1940s generation led by Schwarzenberger was too scholarly inclined and committed to stronger legalist and positivist views of international economic law (Vide above n 40-50, and accompanying text. Vide also Kennedy, above n 13, at 61; Reich, above n 13, at 775-776; Weiler, above n 13, at 194-197; Howse, above n 13, at 98-99 (2002) ). 56 They focused on formal question as to whether IEL was ontologically and epistemologically distinct from international law. Consequently, legal theory occupied a prominent place in debates about IEL's nature, driving the choice of methods to identify formal concepts and legal sources. More specifically, IEL was conceptualized, examined and applied as if it were a coherent and self-contained system of distinguished positive rules and institutions (Vide above n 45-50, and accompanying text 
C. The Traditional Approach to the History of International Economic Law
59 The 1980s generation led by Jackson is praised for having introduced the central transformations that revived the IEL field. First, they bracketed the controversies over the formal autonomy of IEL, and recast their different views not as mutually exclusive responses to theoretical questions, but rather as alternative realist methodologies that could be chosen and applied to solve IEL-related disputes and problems according to personal conviction and contextual necessity. Charnovitz's article depicts the move to functionalism in sections I and III. While section III accounts for the jurisprudential story, section I introduces the different 'concepts', 'methods' or 'approaches' to IEL. These legal ideas and techniques are presented not as ontological responses framed as true or false hypotheses provided by legal scholars in historically situated contexts. Rather, they are juxtaposed as ahistorical, neutral, scientific methodologies to be chosen by lawyers not due to their inherent validity or legitimacy but according to contextual considerations and personal belief (Charnovitz, above n 22, at 607-611, 616-624). Second, the move from grand theories to functionalist methods of analysis was combined with an instrumentalist approach to IEL, through which the validity and legitimacy of a legal norm or regime were tested against its effectiveness in providing the legal basis for dealing with concrete cases of international economic affairs. The instrumentalist turn is clearly reflected in section IV, whereby Charnovitz does not analyse the relationship between IEL and international law from a formal or normative viewpoint. In contrast, he examines whether and how IEL should influence or interact with international law with the aim of solving current challenges faced by global governance (Charnovitz, above n 22, at 624-625). Finally, this pragmatic perspective shifted the focus of IEL expertise from legal certainty and stability to problem-solving, normative change and institutional progress. to explore what an analysis of the IEL field's history and boundaries can tell us today about the repertoire of ideas, practices, rules and institutions that was relegated to the dustbin of past due to disciplinary consensus. I am specifically interested in uncovering and criticizing the strategies undertaken to entail demarcation effects so as to assist in broadening the horizons of the possibility to propose alternatives to transform international economic law and governance.
II. Between History and Boundaries: the Limits of the Traditional Approach to the History of International Economic Law
As the previous section suggests, boundary-drawing and history-telling tend to be assumed as unrelated, or perhaps contrasting, disciplinary modes of governance situated on opposite sides of the IEL expertise. By contrast, the traditional approach has in fact combined history and boundaries, in order to reconstruct (what I have called so far) conventional narratives. The purpose of these historical accounts has been to legitimize and validate the IEL field's borders by controlling the intra-expertise production of knowledge and norms, and to ensure its extra-expertise influence by carving out an exclusive space for policymaking in global economic governance. By instrumentalizing history to drawing boundaries, the past is subordinated to the present in order to determine as to whether a project, norm or idea is either a present-day outcome of progressive development (and so belonging to the field), an old (and non-applicable) relic or non-part of the IEL domain. I suggest, therefore, that one possibility to rethink the current constraints of the IEL expertise is through the understanding and critique of how the traditional approach has structured the interaction between history and boundaries.
There are numerous possibilities to approach the history of the field of international economic law rather than the traditional style. As I shall discuss below, the traditional approach tends, consciously or otherwise, to instrumentalize IEL history in order to justify and legitimize a particular programme by claiming it is the natural or logical consequence of a neutral and universal set of lessons. Indeed, this traditional style often blurs the line drawn to differentiate historical reconstructions from normative programs.
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The peril consists of emphasizing aspects of history that support one's underlying policy-ideologicalintellectual commitment as factual determinants while leaving others necessarily (and perhaps strategically) in the forgotten realm of the past. As shown by the previous section, there are two types of storylines, which might be combined or not, that have been conventionally employed to tell the history of the IEL field with the aim of demarcating its boundaries. These ontological and epistemological premises produce blind spots that often lead the traditional approach to overlooking how intra-expertise political and intellectual struggles have shaped the contemporary IEL field. This implies that, to produce a universal history, conventional narratives frequently fail to take into consideration socio-economic contexts, political compromises or intellectual concessions responsible for making and interpreting IEL norms and regimes, while obscuring disciplinary bias and marginalizing alternative ideas and practices within the IEL expertise. 75 Therefore, embedded into the traditional approach, the Modernist commitment to teleology requires the adoption, preceded or not by theoretical justification, of a universal concept of international economic law as the condition sine qua non to begin the process of uncovering its history. This restricts, in turn, IEL history to the conventional narratives that often support the dominant normative programmes underpinning the concept chosen ex ante. 
My analysis of Charnovitz

III. Towards an Alternative Approach to the History of International Economic Law
In an attempt to address or avoid some of the shortcomings inherent to the traditional style of historicizing international economic law, I provide below the contours of an alternative approach grounded in four strategies.
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A. Widening the Historical Boundaries of International Economic Law
The first strategy purports to place the origins and development of international economic law within a broader historical trajectory. I propose to widen the scope so as to analyse the ways in which IEL was 'founded' in relation not only to the 'rest' of international law but also to the 'other' international economic policymaking domains existing between 1944 and 1994. This consists of retelling institutional and jurisprudential stories in light of a more comprehensive frame. Hence, the aim is to prevent the bias and blind spots created by traditional narratives from constraining today's IEL expertise in two important ways.
The acceptance of the idea of the GATT/WTO, the Bretton Woods institutions, the ICSID and My argument is not that the mainstream literature has completely disregarded the existence of other international organizations or regimes specializing in economic affairs. Rather, I argue that it tends not to account for the other regimes as contenders for governing international economic relations. For instance, there were institutional alternatives to the GATT offered by competing expert projects and normative programmes that have been forgotten or ignored by the IEL history. From the 1950s until the early 1990s, global trade governance was organized around three multilateral trade regimes: the GATT, the United Nations Conference 
B. Endogenising the History and Boundaries of International Economic Law
I suggest that we suspend our habit of imagining IEL as a special body of legal rules and institutions that can be empirically identified and scientifically analysed. By contrast, IEL can be conceived not as a result of a unilateral process of normative, jurisprudential or institutional specialization or fragmentation, which is possible to be 'discovered' and 'apprehended' by international lawyers, regardless their historical context, through the identification of a distinguishable group of universal norms and regimes holding a natural or logical speciality.
Instead, I propose to approach the foundation and evolution of international economic law as (part of) the creation and advancement of the IEL field, which were carried out by a contextualized group of legal practitioners and intellectuals between the late 1940s and the early 1990s. 80 Three consequences derive from understanding that the 'origins' and 'progress' of IEL were intertwined with the 'invention', 'maturation', and 'defence' of the IEL expertise. First, the IEL field is regarded as not only a formal body of rules, institutions, and doctrines, but also a way of thinking and practicing those norms, regimes or techniques. It involves the production, transmission and maintenance of knowledge between lawyers so that ideas and methods are routinely embedded ceasing to be politically or intellectually contested. In particular, the mainstream understanding of the IEL field's history and boundaries reflect emblematically the continuous labour of contemporary lawyers to encapsulate a specific set of political decisions, intellectual commitments, historical facts and normative positions into the conventional narratives. Moreover, those historical accounts are regarded as carrying out central lessons that smooth the process of decision-making and consensus building within the IEL expertise. These teachings are employed to 'construct' the IEL field having more or less influence depending on contingent factors related to the authority and legitimacy of their proponents and reasoning. In this sense, jurisprudential and institutional stories were neither neutral nor apolitical. Rather, they were produced by lawyers pursuing, personal or collective, projects, who are located in different jurisdictions, educated according to distinct legal traditions, and committed to divergent political groups and ideological mind-sets. 81 The consequence of this view is to contest the field's traditional claim to universalism and perpetuity of IEL, since it cannot be sustained empirically, but only aspired intellectually.
Thus, I suggest that the making of IEL history should combine an analysis of the field's intellectual history with an investigation of the performance of its members as designers and managers of international economic law and governance. The purpose of an alternative approach is to investigate how inside disciplinary struggles and outside political-economic conflicts shape the construction, contestation and validation of historical narratives that constitute the contemporary understanding of the IEL field.
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C. Breaking up with Modernism: IEL History as Temporal Contestations of Disciplinary Boundaries
My proposal is to depart from the Modernist commitment to a progressive, linear and universal style of IEL history that often instrumentalizes institutional or jurisprudential stories to reassert disciplinary boundaries so as to support particular normative programmes. 83 This means to resist to our impulse born out of the traditional approach to constructing narratives of IEL rules, institutions and doctrines by working backwards in order to 'uncover' a single lineage that justifies the natural or logical 81 To understand international economic law as a transnational field, it is imperative to be aware of two basic sorts of internal dynamics: the intellectual dynamic of commitment and aversion and the professional dynamic of affiliation and disaffiliation. The interplay of intellectual and political disputes tends to determine relations of differentiation, dominance and disruption both inside and outside the IEL field. More precisely, the IEL boundary expands and diminishes by the continuous process of decision-making and consensus-building that underlying those group dynamics (Kennedy, above n 14, at 408-414; Roberts, above n 80, at 1-6). 82 The IEL field is shaped by internal and external disputes over authority and resources. Within the discipline, there is the often-neglected interplay between domestic, national and transnational interactions among legal practitioners and academics. Lawyers pledges their allegiance to intellectual traditions, political groupings and normative programmes that are created and developed in contextualized settings. This implies that IEL ideas and practices are, in general, not universal or transnational per se, but rather nurtured in a particular place and then transferred to others. The importing-exporting dynamics can be seen as a form of 'transnationalized localism', which consists of a process by which a particular normative programme, jurisprudential project, or institutional vision succeeds in extending its reach over the IEL field and, by doing so, develops the capacity to designate a rival alternative as local. Not surprisingly, the acceptance and rejection of IEL projects, knowledge and techniques are deeply depended on the relative geopolitical power of their production sites. As I discuss in this paper, theories, methods and doctrines developed in the United States have exerted far greater influence over the IEL expertise than the ones produced in France or African countries (Roberts, above n 80, at 8-9. Vide also Boaventura de Sousa Santos, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION 178-179 (2002) 
D. Departing from Anglocentrism: IEL History as Spatial Contestation of Disciplinary Boundaries
This strategy consists of breaking up with Anglocentrism. 84 If IEL is understood as a transnational field that aggregates lawyers from and working in multiple jurisdictions, historical narratives shall also be conceived as produced in sites located outside the Anglo-American world. This move entails two consequences. It is necessary to take into consideration that IEL has been thought and practiced in distinct contexts. Nonetheless, the validity and legitimacy of ideas and techniques hinge on the dynamic interplay between different legal communities within the IEL expertise. This disciplinary interaction is affected by the unequal distribution of authority and resources. Consequently, it is particularly important to be aware of the effects of certain 'spatial' differences over the production of approaches to legal history, as well as of the extent to which some of these styles of history-telling The third aspiration is to contribute to debates on contemporary issues of international economic law by rethinking the history of the present. Understanding IEL history as part of today's practice involves revealing how the work of embedding normative, institutional and jurisprudential projects through historical narratives, has shaped the field's identity, mission and influence in global economic governance. Nowadays, it is common-sense to argue that IEL is somehow losing its effectiveness or perhaps heading towards a critical moment. The reasons lie partially in doubts about the limits of the Neoliberal programme itself, and partially in fears about the capacity of IEL, as expertise and mode of governance, to provide solutions to present-day problems. In providing a new way of understanding the interaction between history and boundaries, an alternative approach aims at penetrating into the field so as to illuminate how it has constituted and moulded the conditions of possibility that enable and constrain lawyers to conceive and practice IEL in their engagement with the contemporary challenges to global economic governance.
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Conclusion
I opened this article by suggesting that the interaction between history and boundary is key to understand the participation of international lawyers in the construction, operation and contestation of 87 The so-called Developmentalism is conceived here as the Third-World programme led by the UNCTAD for an international regime for economic cooperation between developed and developing countries. The aim was at striking a compromise between two goals: on the one hand, the request for establishing a multilateral system for fairer, though dependent, economic cooperation; and, on the other hand, the desire for emancipatory intervention to foster economic development. This compromise between economic preference at international level and development interventionism at domestic level is at the core of the Developmentalist programme (Bedjaoui, above n 78, at 188-189, 250-253; Abi-Saab, above n 78, at 102-104; Elias, above n 78, at [39] [40] [208] [209] . 88 The so-called Neoliberalism is understood here as a normative programme developed as a reaction to the economic turmoil of the 1970s, which contributed to erode the political and intellectual support for the Liberalwelfarism. It differs from the previous programme for several reasons, but two are central. First, it shifts the Liberal-welfarist compromise towards economic liberalism on both international and domestic levels. Second, it reimagines the world economy as a global market whose production and welfare potential are to be realized through 'deep' liberalization (Lang, above n 72, at Part II; Orford, above n 70, at 709-710; Howse, above n 17). 89 Howse makes a similar argument when pointing out that the contemporary international lawyers have failed in rethinking IEL jurisprudence because they have been either unable or disinterested in taking seriously the new progressive scholarship in international economics led by Thomas Piketty, Dani Rodrik, Joseph Stiglitz and Jeffrey Sachs (above n 3, at 188). However, Howse might not have gone far or deep enough, to the extent that his "allies" are all economists situated at leading universities in the Anglo-American world. There are also other non-legal experts whose cutting-edge work has been continuously overlooked or marginalized by the IEL field, such as Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, Ha-Joon Chang, Mushtaq Khan, and John Ravenhill.
international regimes for regulating trade, monetary and financial affairs. Throughout the article, I
have demonstrated that the IEL boundaries result from the interplay between intellectual debates meaningfully grounded in history lessons and the political disputes arising out of collective and individual pursuits of authority and legitimacy. In this context, the function of the traditional style of history-telling is two-fold. It narrates the past as teachings to support normative, jurisprudential and institutional projects for governing the world economy. It chronicles the past as lessons to conceive, frame, argue and solve international economic problems through law. This means that the traditional approach has great responsibility for producing the conditions of possibility that empower and constrain lawyers' imaginative interaction with global economic governance. More specifically, I
claim that this approach has excessively limited the IEL imagination preventing lawyers from offering inventive solutions to dealing with the contemporary issues.
Furthermore, the upheavals within the Western developed countries (mainly caused by the Trump Administration and the Brexit negotiations) and the rise of China are reshaping international economic law and governance. It is reasonable to assume that these challenges will not vanish by themselves or wait for the IEL expertise to move beyond the consensus around the traditional approach. It is also expected that, if lawyers fail in participating in the construction of innovative proposals or alternatives, other experts and policymakers will fill in the gap. The consequence of inadequate or unsatisfactory engagement might cause the marginalization of the IEL expertise within the global economic governance and the disruption of its core features.
If my analysis is correct, the IEL field should seek to relax its disciplinary frontiers in order to produce alternative ways to reform and transform the international economic order. This would include welcoming innovative projects, new ideas and inventive techniques from legal and non-legal experts located outside Anglo-American, orthodox sites. In addition, the IEL expertise should rethink its own history in order to recover the sense it once had that the field was characterized by normative heterogeneity, institutional experimentalism and jurisprudential innovation. I hope that the proposed alternative approach will assist in broadening the IEL boundaries so as to lessen the disciplinary constraints while empowering lawyers to re-imagine IEL in response to the contemporary challenges.
Therefore, I want to conclude by offering some research avenues through which this new approach can expand our comprehension of history and boundary interaction. In an attempt to address or avoid some of those shortcomings inherent to the traditional approach, the fourth strategy is to resituate the foundation and development of international economic law within a wider temporal trajectory and special context. The aim is to cause history-telling to take into consideration not only the 'rest' of international law but also the 'other' international economic policymaking domains and institutionalized regimes of economic governance existing between 1944 and 1994. More specifically, history lessons should be learned not as the outcome of a unilateral process of normative or institutional specialization or fragmentation, which is possible to be 'discovered'. Instead, they should be conceived as part of the inside disciplinary struggles and outside political-economic conflicts underscoring the 'invention', 'maturation', and 'defence' of the IEL field itself.
Furthermore, I propose to retell the IEL history as single, universal, and neutral accounts of past events, but rather as contingent and partial stories carrying out normative programmes, 
